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I. INTRODUcTION

On October 23, 1974, the Ninety-Third Congress enacted the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 19741 which greatly
amended the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act 2 and hence revolution-

ized the regulation of commodities trading in the United States. In
1978, Congress further amended the federal commodities laws by
enacting the Futures Trading Act of 1978. 3 The most significant
aspect of these developments was the creation of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission or the CFTC), 4 an independent federal regulatory agency modeled in the image of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Delaware Law School of Widener University. B.A.,
1969, Queens College; M.A., 1972, New School for Social Research; J.D., 1974, Brooklyn Law
School; LL.M., 1979, New York University. Professor Sackheim is a member of the American
Bar Association's Subcommittee to Study the Structure and Function of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission.
Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (codified in various
sections of 7 U.S.C.). For an excellent discussion of the legislative background surrounding the
passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, see Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemptionas Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1, 120 (1976). See generally Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successor, 6 HoFsTRA
L. REv. 1 (1977).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976). The Commodity Exchange Act amended the Grain Futures Act
of 1922, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
The Commodity Exchange Act was limited in its coverage due to a narrow definition of the
term commodity. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). With expanding futures markets, products falling outside
of the strict statutory definition of a commodity were being traded free from regulatory coverage. Moreover, fluctuating economies of food production and sale gave rise to a belief that
regulation of commodity futures could stabilize distribution and prices. Johnson, supra, note 1,
at 3-4.
3 Pub. L. No 95-405, 92 Stat. 865, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (codified in various sections
of 7 U.S.C.). The 1974 Act and 1978 amendments will collectively be referred to as the Act. For
a good general discussion of the 1978 legislation, see Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission: A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAW. 1755 (1979).
1 See 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a) (1976). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
contained a "sunset" provision whereby CFTC funding was only authorized for the period
through fiscal 1978. One amendment contained in the Futures Trading Act of 1978 extended
authorized funding through September 30, 1982. See 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (Supp. 111978); Young, A
Test of Federal Sunset: Congressional Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 27 EMoRY L.J. 853 (1978).
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The CFTC was mandated by Congress to administer and enforce the
commodities laws in order to improve the regulation of commodity
futures trading 5 and to protect the investing public and commercial
users of the commodities markets from abusive and criminal practices

in an industry which has witnessed substantial growth over the last
twenty years. 6
The CFTC has been granted extensive enforcement jurisdiction
to insure that Commission registrants and those whose acts render
them subject to the purview of the Act comply with the federal
commodities laws. 7 For violations of the laws within its regulatory
jurisdiction, the CFTC is empowered to seek appropriate federal
court injunctive relief." Furthermore, through administrative disciplinary proceedings, the Commission is authorized to suspend or revoke the registration of persons registered with it, to prohibit persons
and entities from trading over contract markets, and to impose significant civil monetary penalties for each violation of the law." The
3 A "commodity futures" contract is a standardized contractual obligation to buy or sell a
fixed amount and grade of a certain commodity to be delivered by a designated date in the
future. See generally TEwELES, HARLOW & STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTUREss GAME 22-24 (1974);
Russo & Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 6
HoFsTRA L. REv. 57-58 n.3 (1977). Commodity futures contracts must be distinguished from
physical commodities purchased or sold over cash markets for future delivery. Section 2(a)(1) of
the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), provides in part that "[t]he term 'future delivery,' as used in this
chapter, shall not include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery'."
See generally G. HOFFMAN, FUTURES TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MAuc'rs IN THE
UNITED STATES

104-10 (1932).

6 In the 10 years between 1964 and 1974, the volume of commodity futures trading
increased 400 per cent. H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1974). Similarly,
futures trading volume grew from 27.7 million contracts in 1974 to 41.5 million contracts for
July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1977. Trading value over these same periods witnessed an
increased from $571.6 billion to $1.1 trillion respectively. See Rainbolt, supra note 1, at 2 n.4. In
1980, 82.7 million commodity futures contracts were traded over all domestic commodity
exchanges. 1980 CFTC ANN. RaP. 87 (1981).
For a discussion of the prevalence of violative and criminal activities in the sale of commodity futures and other commodity transactions, see Johnson, The First and Fastest Felony:
Trading Futures Off the Exchanges, 35 Bus. LAW. 711 (1980); Comment, Abuses in the Commodity Markets: Some Suggestionsfor Control, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 788 (1974); Note, Abuses in
the Commodity Markets: The Need for Change in the Regulatory Structure, 63 GEo. L.J. 751
(1975); Maidenberg, When the Commodity Pitchman Calls, Hang Up, N.Y. Times, May 22,
1977, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
7 Aside from those who are registered with the Commission, individuals involved in the
interstate offer or sale of commodity futures contracts also fall within the purview of the
commodity laws. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6b, 6c, 13b (1976).
8 See, e.g., CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978); CFTC v. British Am.
Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135 2d Cir. 1977); CFTC v. U.S. Metals Depository
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see section 6c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-I (1976).
9 See Sections 6(b) and 6(c) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9, 13b (1976). Section 6(b) provides that
in the event the Commission "has reason to believe that any person (other than a contract
market)" is violating the Act, it may serve upon such person a complaint containing a notice of
hearing "requiring such person to show cause why an order should not be made prohibiting it
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CFTC may also refer matters and accumulated evidence to the Department of Justice and recommend the initiation of criminal prosecutions by that department.10 It is within the context of its own administrative enforcement and disciplinary proceedings, however, that the
Commission is able to best articulate its jurisdictional and legislative
philosophy 1 and to exhibit to the professional community and investing public its ability to police the commodity industry. 12 This article
will explore the administrative procedures by which the CFTC investigates and enforces the federal commodities laws and examine the
standards which the agency applies in its "in-house" administrative
proceedings as well as those which the courts apply in certain enforcement actions.
II. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
CFTC's ENFORCEMENT TEAM
The CFTC is organized into five branches, four of which play a
vital and integral role in the agency's enforcement effort.
The Division of Trading and Markets is responsible for "monitoring exchange surveillance enforcement activities, for screening applicants for registration as industry professionals, and for conducting
audits and reviews of the financial condition and practices of regis-

from trading on or subject to the rules of any contract market." Id. § 9. Section 6(b) also
authorizes the Commission to assess violators of the Act "a civil penalty of not more than
$100,000." Id.
Section 6(c) similarly provides that "the Commission may, upon notice and hearing . . .
make and enter an order directing" that any violator of the Act "cease and desist" from such
action. In the event that the recipient of the cease and desist order fails to comply with such
order, that person "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $100,000, or imprisoned for not less than 6 months nor more than one year, or
both." Id. § 13b.
Orders issued by the Commission pursuant to section 6(b) or 6(c) are appealable to the
United States circuit courts of appeal. See id. §§ 9, 13b.
"o The Act imposes substantial criminal penalties for certain violations of the commodities
laws. See Section 9 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1978).
11Justice Holmes' declaration in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), is
particularly illustrative of an agency's administrative role as distinguished from a court's judicial
functions. In that case he stated that:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and
end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power.
Id. at 226.
12See generally Schief & Morkham, The Nation's "Commodity Cops"-Efforts by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to Enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 34 Bus.
LAW. 19 (1978).
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trants."I 3 Substantial work is conducted in the surveillance of trade
practices and in the investigation of contract markets activity. This
Division also plays a vital role in the administrative rule-making
functions of the agency. Inquiries conducted by the Trading and
Markets Division are often conducted with a view toward promulgating new regulations rather than uncovering wrong-doing.
The Division of Economics and Education "monitors the operation of all active futures contract markets each day to head off any
developing threats of corners, manipulation, or other market disturbance." 14 When appropriate, its findings are referred to the CFTC's
Division of Enforcement for appropriate enforcement action.
The Division of Enforcement investigates and prosecutes alleged
violations of the federal commodity laws involving commodity futures
contracts trading on contract markets and the trading of off-exchange
commodity instruments. 15 The Enforcement Division routinely cooperates with state and other federal law enforcement agencies in conducting its inquiries. As previously noted,' 6 the CFTC (through the
Division of Enforcement) refers matters to, and cooperates with, the
Justice Department in cases of alleged criminal violations of the commodity laws and various other related criminal statutes such as those
concerning wire and mail fraud17 and conspiracy. Consequently, the
Enforcement Division often assigns personnel to assist the Justice Department in related criminal investigations and prosecutions.' 8
The Enforcement Division has the primary investigative authority within the CFTC,19 and the Director of the Enforcement Division
must "report to the Commission the results of his investigations and
recommend to the Commission such enforcement action as he deems

1980 CFTC ANN REP 116(1981)
14Id.
13

Is Id. at 92. All domestically traded commodity futures contracts must be transacted over
regulated commodity futures exchanges which are designated by the CFTC as "contract markets" pursuant to section 5 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). Section 4 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6h
(1976), prohibits interstate commodity futures transactions "executed or consummated otherwise
than by or through a member of contract market." See In re Stovall Co., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,941 (Dec. 6, 1979).
18 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
17 In United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1980), it was held that the exclusive
jurisdiction given the CFTC by virtue of section 2(a)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), does not
preempt the Justice Department from prosecuting commodity law violators for mail fraud. 617
F.2d at 309-11.
18 See e.g., In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 267-69 (7th Cir. 1978) (not inappropriate for CFIC
attorney to serve as Special Assistant U.S. Attorney and appear before grand jury in criminalcommodity matter); see section 12 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
19 See 17 C.F.R. § 11.2 (1981).
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appropriate. ' 20 The Enforcement Division is staffed with investigators comprised of futures trading specialists and investigative and trial
attorneys. Its staff is located in New York, Chicago, San Francisco
and Washington, D.C., with all investigations and civil prosecutions
ultimately supervised by the Division's Washington, D.C. administrative personnel.
The CFTC's Office of General Counsel reviews CFTC staff requests for enforcement action and represents the CFTC before the
United States courts of appeal and Supreme Court. The General
Counsel's Office also defends the Commission and its staff in suits
brought to challenge Commission investigative or enforcement activities and is responsible for filing amicus curiae briefs 2in actions involving CFTC enforcement and investigative activities. '
Through close intra and inter-agency cooperation, the CFTC
enforces the federal commodity laws with the goal of protecting the
investing public from fraud and deceit.
III. COMMISSION INVESTIGATIONS
As a relatively new regulatory agency, the CFTC has initiated
numerous formal investigations and informal inquiries, and has commenced numerous and diverse administrative and federal court injunctive proceedings against alleged violators of the federal commodity laws. The most ubiquitous exchange-related violations appear to
encompass attempted or actual market manipulations, deceptive acts

aimed at customers, and illegal trading practices such as wash sales
22
Most offand other fictitious sales of commodity futures contracts.

exchange violations policed by the Commission involve the offer and
sale of investment instruments which are actually commodity op-

20

21

Id. § 11.2(a).
Markham, Investigations Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 31 AD. L. REv. 285, 290

(1979); 1977 CFTC ANN. REP. 85-103 (1978); see 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c) (1981).
'22Section 4c of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1976), prohibits any transaction in a commodity
which "is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, a 'wash sale,' 'cross trade,'
or accomodation trade,' or is a fictitious sale." "Wash sales" have been defined by many courts.
E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.25 (1976)(" 'wash sales' are transactions
involving no change in beneficial ownership"); United States v. New York Coffee & SugarExchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 611 (1924)(wash sales in the commodities market are "bets upon the
market in which it is understood between the parties that neither is bound to deliver or accept
delivery"); People v. Kellogg, 105 A.D. 505, 514, 94 N.Y.S. 617, 622-23 (Sup. Ct. 1905)(wash
sale occurred where "the broker purchased and sold for the defendant and his associates ...
[and] [t]he actual transaction was solely theirs; nothing was paid save that the broker received
his commission").
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tions 23 or the alleged sale of commodity futures contracts outside the
regulated commodity markets. 24 During 1980, the CFTC's Division
of Enforcement opened 777 investigations and commenced 36 administrative enforcement proceedings and 19 federal court injunctive enforcement proceedings for alleged violations of the Act and its accom25
panying regulations.
Prior to the commencement of a formal adversarial enforcement
action, the CFTC conducts an investigation of the unlawful conduct.26 Commission investigations are begun through a variety of
means, including customer complaints, referrals from other agencies,
industry complaints, and inquiries initiated by the Commission based
upon registration reviews. The Act imposes broad record keeping
requirements upon commodity professionals and those engaged in
futures transactions and mandates that such records be27kept readily
available for inspection by Commission representatives.

2 A commodity option confers upon the purchaser the contractual right to buy or sell either
a specified commodity or a commodity futures contract within a certain period of time at a given
price. See British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 484-85 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977).
By the 1978 amendments, Congress imposed a general ban on the offer and sale of commodity options. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c) (Supp. 111978). An exception to this prohibition was nonetheless
provided for "dealers," that is United States domiciles "'who on May 1, 1978 [were] in the
business of granting .. . options on ... physical commodities and [were] in the business of
buying, selling, producing, or otherwise using that commodity." Id. § 6c(d). These dealers were
permitted to "continue to grant or issue options on that commodity in accordance with Commission regulations." Id. This general prohibition on commodity option transactions shall continue
until the CFTC submits to Congress evidence of its ability to properly regulate such transactions.
See id. § 6c(c). For an excellent discussion of commodity options regulation in the United States.
see Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1095.
24 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
2 1980 CFTC ANN. REP. 94 (1981).
*. See Rules Relating to Investigations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-.8 (1981). For an extensive
discussion of Commission investigations, see Markham supra note 21.
27 Sections 4g and 4i of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6g, 6i (1976), present the record-keeping duties
of futures commission merchants and floor brokers. Section 4n of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1976),
delineates what records are required to be kept by commodity trading advisors and commodity
pool operators.
Records "required to be kept by the Act" or by any regulations promulgated thereunder
must "be kept for a period of five years from the date thereof and shall be readily accessible
during the first 2 years of the 5 year period." 17 C.F.R. § 1.31(a)(1) (1976). Moreover, these
books and records are "open to inspection by any representative of the Commission or the U.S.
Department of Justice." Id. It should be noted, however, that a district court recently held that
the "required records" doctrine will not preclude the claim of fifth amendment privileges by an
unregistered ostensible commodity pool operator against required production of the records
where the nature of the records indicated by their mere existence that they were evidence of
criminal activity. CFTC v. Buterin, 2 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,133, at 24,606-07 (D.
Kan. Dec 29, 1980).
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Section 6(b) of the Act 28 provides that the Commission may
institute formal administrative adversarial proceedings against certain
classes29 of alleged commodities law violators, requiring the recipient
of the complaint and notice of hearing to show cause why specified
remedial sanctions should not be imposed upon him. These remedial
sanctions may include a possible prohibition from trading on any
contract market, a possible suspension or revocation of CFTC registration status, and the imposition of a civil monetary penalty.30
In preparing for possible adversarial enforcement proceedings
the Commission may conduct an informal inquiry into alleged viola
tive activity or it may issue a formal written order of investigation
setting forth a general description of the scope of the formal investigation. This order would also set forth the authority pursuant to which
the formal investigation is being conducted, and may authorize the
staff to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces tecum
31
pursuant to the formal order of investigation.
Commission subpoenae are generally prepared by the staff subject to the authority of the Commission's formal order of investigation
and may require the recipient to testify and/or produce documents
relating to any matter under investigation. 32 Because of the quasicriminal nature of the investigation, the subpoenaed witness has certain rights. Among them are the right to be advised and represented
by counsel 33 and the right to refuse to answer questions on the basis of
34
the witness's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
There are, however, criminal penalties imposed on a witness who
makes false statements under oath during the course of a Commission
investigation 35 or who makes willful misrepresentations to Commis36
sion staff, whether or not made under oath.

U 7 U.S.C § 9 (1976).
2 Section 6(b) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976), covers "any person (other than a contract

market)" who is allegedly "manipulating or attempting to manipulate. . . the market price of
any commodity." The provision then discusses the Commission's authority to require that
suspected futures commission merchants, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and floor brokers show cause why such individuals' registration with the Commission
"should not be suspended or revoked." Id.

30 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b (1976); note 9 supra and accompanying text.
3' 17 C.F.R. § 11.4 (1981).
32 See id.
31 See id. § 11.7(c).
3, See id. § 11.7(d)(1).
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 11.6(6) (1976).

1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 11.6(b) (1981).
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Unlike subpoenae issued by the SEC, non-compliance with
CFTC subpoenae is not per se illegal. 37 The Commission must enforce compliance with its subpoenae by obtaining an enforcement

order from a federal district court. 38 The Commission is not, however, required to make an express showing in its application that the
recipient of the subpoena is a person or entity subject to the provisions
of the Act. 39 Moreover, in the absence of a showing by the recipient
of a CFTC subpoena that the documents are irrelevant to the agency
investigation, subpoenaed records are considered prima facie relevant
to the CFTC investigation and the district court will insist upon
compliance. 40 Courts will also presume regularity in the issuance of
the subpoena, the burden of showing irregularity resting squarely
upon the recipient of the subpoena. 41 This burden is difficult to
overcome because the CFTC, like all independent federal agencies,
may formally "investigate [a subject] merely on suspicion that the law
42
is being violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is not."Based on the evidence and information gathered through its
investigation, the Enforcement Division will determine whether an
enforcement action should be initiated. If some action is recom17 15 U.S.C. § 78u (c) (1976) makes it a misdemeanor for a person without "'just cause" to fail
to respond to a subpoena issued pursuant to an SEC formal order of investigation. Id. No
comparable provision exists under the commodity laws.
3 Section 13(3) of the 1978 Act, 7 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. 11 1978) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 15
(1976)), expressly provides:
the Commission may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the
jurisdiction in which the investigation or proceeding is conducted, or where such
person resides or transacts business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and
other records.
Id.
3 Id.; see CFTC v. First Nat'l Bullion Corp., 461 F. Supp. 659, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aJfd.
598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
40 Id. at 661-62.
" See Siegel Trading Co., Inc. v. CFTC, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,212 (N.D. 11. Sept. 27, 1976), aff'd, Civ. No. 76-2233 (7th Cir. 1977). But see
CFTC v. Rosenthal & Co., 2 Cos1M. Fur. L. REP.. (CCH) 21,012 (N.D. Ill. March 18, 1980)
(respondent granted limited discovery in subpoena enforcement proceeding regarding purpose
and scope of Commission's investigation and degree of cooperation with Justice Department).
42 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). As the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit observed in SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974):
Every person doing business and every investor knows that government agencies
conduct investigations for a variety of reasons, and most of them feel the duty to
respond to a proper inquiry. As for those whose practices are investigated, it is a
necessary hazard of doing business to be the subject of inquiry by a government
regulatory agency.
Id. at 1056 (emphasis added).
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mended, specific advice will also be made as to the persons and
entities against whom the action should be taken, the appropriate
forum for the commencement of the action, and the nature and types
of remedies which should be sought to protect the public and further
the goals of the Commission.43 The Commission will consider the
recommendations of the Enforcement Division at a non-public Commission meeting.14 Defense counsel who is aware of the Enforcement
Division's recommendations may submit arguments to the Commission concerning reasons why the Enforcement Division's recommendations should be modified or why the Commission should refrain
from commencing an enforcement action. Unlike the SEC, 45 the
CFTC has not adopted a formal procedure for the submission of such
46
arguments, and consequently submissions may be of limited value.
Nevertheless, upon learning of the CFTC's investigation, defense
counsel should seek to communicate with the CFTC staff in the
expectation of expeditiously settling the dispute, informally discovering the thrust of the CFTC's inquiry and intentions, suggesting to the
staff the appropriate wording of the charges and/or settlement order,
47
and arranging for a grant of "use" immunity for his or her client.
Frequently, the subject of a CFTC investigation is either simultaneously the subject of a parallel criminal investigation, or will be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution upon the
48
completion of the Commission's investigation and civil prosecution.
As such, communication should be aimed at preparing counsel for
client representation before the CFTC as well as before other investigative authorities.

See generally Markham, supra note 21.
See 17 C.F.R. § 147.3(b) (1981).
" The SEC has adopted a procedure whereby "involved" persons may "on their own
initiative" submit statements to the Commission expressing their positions regarding the investigation. The SEC staff may then "in its discretion" provide such persons with general information
relating to the investigation and establish a time framework for the submission of additional
statements by the interested persons which will be forwarded to the Commission for consideration. Id. § 202.5(c).
40 See Markham, supra note 21, at 312-13.
47 Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 11.7(d)(2) (1981), the Commission, with the approval of the
Attorney General of the United States, may confer "use" immunity upon a witness. See 18
U.S.C. § 6001 (1976). See generallySmaltz, Tactical Considerationsfor Effective Representation
During a Government Investigation, 16 Am. CuN. L. Rv. 383 (1979).
" For discussions of issues which arise when a regulatory agency and the Department of
Justice are conducting parallel investigations of the same subject, see Pickholz, ParallelEnforcement Proceedings:Guidelines for the CorporateLawyer. 7 SEC. REc. L.J. 99 (1979).
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IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING BEFORE THE CFTC
A. Discovery in the Administrative Proceeding
Pre-hearing discovery in the context of a CFTC administrative
proceeding is less structured and less broad than the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 49 Regulations 10.42
and 10.44 of the CFTC's Rules of Practice50 generally govern the
scope of discovery in CFTC proceedings and vest with the presiding
administrative law judge broad discretion. Pursuant to the rules, the
judge may, in his discretion, order the Commission staff and the
respondent to outline their cases setting forth the legal theories upon
which each party will rely. 5' In addition, the judge may require the
parties to identify the witnesses who will testify in their behalf and to
furnish copies of or a list of documents to be introduced at the hear52
ing.
Both the Commission staff and the respondent have the right to
serve the other side with a written request for admissions 53 which
must be responded to either in the form of a good faith objection, or
good faith denial; however, lack of information or knowledge may
not be invoked as a reason for failure of a party to admit or deny the
requested admission "unless he states that he has made reasonable
inquiry and that the information known or reasonably available to
him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny." 54 The administrative law judge may then enter appropriate orders assessing the
sufficiency of the responses. 55 Depositions and interrogatories may be
permitted, at the discretion of the administrative law judge and upon
the written application of a party, when a prospective material witness for good cause will be unable to attend the hearing. 56 As such,
the deposition and interrogatory tools provided for in the regulations
are not really intended to be a discovery device, but are basically to be

4 See generally Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace with Modern Court
Developed Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, 12 AD. L. BULL. 103, 114 (1959);
Discovery in Agency Adjudication, Recommendations and Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Jan. 8, 1968-June 30, 1970, Recommendation No. 21 (1971).
'o 17 C.F.R. §§ 10.42, 10.44 (1981).
, Id. §§ 10.42(a)(1)-.42(a)(2).
52 Id. §§ 10.42(a)(3)-.42(a)(4). Unless ordered otherwise, the Commission staff must also
make available to the respondent prior to the hearing date copies of documents obtained during
the Commission's pre-complaint investigation, including "transcripts of testimony, signed statements and substantially verbatim reports of interviews which were obtained during the investigation ... and all exhibits to those transcripts, statements and reports." Id. § 10.42(b).
I' § 10.42(c)(1).
Id.
" Id. § 10.42(c)(2).
Id. § 10.42(c)(3).
" Id. § 10.44(a).
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a witness who
utilized for the purpose of preserving the testimony of
57
would otherwise be unable to testify at the hearing.

In a recent disciplinary proceeding,58 the Commission ordered
the Division of Enforcement to produce "as a matter of due process

...any material of which it is aware that is arguably exculpatory
as to either guilt or punishment." 59 The Commission further ordered
that such exculpatory evidence be turned over to the respondent prior
to the hearing pursuant to the criminal law doctrine established in
Brady v. Maryland.60 The Commission's ruling, which may be invoked as precedent in disciplinary matters adjudicated before the
CFTC, represents an innovative application of common rules of fair
play which have heretofore been denied respondents in SEC administrative proceedings. 6 '
B. The Commencement of the Proceeding and Administrative

Remedies
The administrative proceeding is an important disciplinary and
enforcement weapon for the inplementation of the federal commodity
laws. Section 6(b) of the Act 6 2 is the principal statute under which the
63
Commission may commence a public administrative proceeding.

57 Id. § 10.44(g); cf. SEC Rule of Practice 15(f)(1), id. § 201(f) (depositions may be used at
SEC hearings only when witness is unavailable for designated reasons).
In re First Guar. Metals Co., 2 Comi!. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,074 (July 2, 1980).
'v Id. at 24,340.
373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court determined that supression by the
prosecution of a confession given by an accused murderer was a denial of the due process rights
of a co-defendant who was being tried separately. Id. at 87.
"' Codified procedures followed by the SEC concerning the production of government
witnesses' statements and reports provide that exculpatory statements are made available for
inspection only after the witness has testified on direct examination at the SEC administrative
hearing. See rule 11.1 of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.11.1 (1981).
Other important CFC Rules of Practice concerning administrative hearings provide for,
inter alia, the scheduling of a pre-hearing conference, id. § 10.41; the requirement that all
hearings be publicly held, id. § 10.64; the right to call expert witnesses at the hearing, id.
§ 10.66(d); the requirement that only relevant, material, and reliable evidence shall be admitted
at the hearing, id. § 10.67(a); the requirement that subpoenae may only be issued upon
application to an administrative law judge, id. § 10.68; the fact that full or partial summary
judgments denominated summary dispositions may be applied for by either party, id. § 10.91;
the procedure for review of the administrative law judge's initial decision by the Commission, id.
§ 10.102; and the manner in which settlements may be reached between respondents and the
Commission, id. § 10.108.
02 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
63 Pursuant to section 6b of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976), the Commission may also
commence appropriate administrative proceedings against a contract market and certain persons
affiliated to a contract market for violations of the federal commodity laws and for failure to
enforce "its rules of government made a condition of its designation." Id.
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Pursuant to section 6(b), the administrative proceeding is commenced
by the service of a complaint and notice of hearing6 4 requiring the
recipient to appear and to "show cause" why specific sanctions should
not be taken by the Commission.65
Section 6(c) of the Act 68 provides that after evidence is heard by
the administrative law judge, the Commission may enter a cease and
desist order preventing further violations of the Act. Section 6(b)
additionally provides that after the evidentiary hearing the Commission may, if appropriate, (1) enter an order prohibiting the violator
from trading on or subject to the rules of any contract market; (2)
suspend or revoke the registration of CFTC registrants; and/or (3)
assess the violator a civil penalty of not more than $100,000 for each
67
violation of the federal commodity laws found to have occurred.
A recipient's failure to comply with an administrative cease and
desist order is a misdemeanor under the Act and "upon conviction
thereof," the violator may be fined up to $100,000, "or imprisoned for
not less than six months nor more than one year, or both." 66 It is
clear from these provisions that the willful violation of a Commission
order may result in a criminal prosecution with attendant penal sanctions.
C. The Burden of Proof in CFTC Administrative
Proceedings
In the 1977 securities law decision of Collins Securities Corp v.
SEC,69 an appeal involving a review of an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that in administrative enforcement proceedings,
where severe remedial and punitive sanctions may be imposed by the
SEC for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities

04 The complaint sets forth the named respondents and the alleged statutory violations;
generally describes the substance of the alleged facts which gave rise to the statutory violations;
designates the time and place for an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge; and
designates the date by which an answer or response must be interposed by the respondents. See
id. § 9. The conduct of the administrative proceeding is governed by the Commission's Rules of
Practice, as set forth in Part 10 of the regulations promulgated under the Act. 17 C.F.R. §§ 10.1.108 (1981). The Rules of Practice governing CFTC reparation proceedings are contained within
Part 12 of the regulations. Id. §§ 12.1-.102.

05 See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
68 Id. § 13b.
- Id. § 9.
- Id. § 13b.
- 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Collins, a broker-dealer and its president were accused
of manipulating the market price of a certain stock, the purchase of which could be achieved
through exercizing stock purchase warrants. Id. at 822.
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laws, the SEC staff must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" the
culpability of the alleged violator. 70 In Collins, the court considered

the serious punitive sanctions that may be imposed by an agency such
as the SEC and concluded that due to the quasi-penal nature and
effect of the sanctions, the quantitative "preponderance of the evidence" standard previously invoked by the SEC in such proceedings
was inadequate. 71 Instead, a "clear and convincing evidence" stand-

ard should be required in administrative proceedings involving allegations of fraud where very serious and punitive-type sanctions may be

imposed. 72 In a recent CFTC administrative decision, 73 a CFTC
administrative law judge adopted the Collins standard of "clear and
convincing evidence" in the74context of a disciplinary proceeding involving allegations of fraud.
On February 25, 1981, however, the Supreme Court in Steadman v. SEC, 7 -5 rejected the "clear and convincing evidence" test and
upheld the use of a "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof

in SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings. 76
10Id.

In reaching its

at 824-26.
71 Id. In discussing the necessity of a fair and just means of assessing proof in administrative
proceedings, the court stated that "we discern a need to subject such evidence (inferences) to a
standard which will ensure that any remedial sanctions are imposed only in those circumstances
where the evidence is of such a quality as to make the sanctions appear just and reasonable." Id.
at 823.
12 Id. at 824-26. Under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the trier of fact "must
believe that it is more probable that the facts are true or exist than it is that they are false or do
not exist," MeBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REv. 242, 261 (1944),
whereas under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, the trier of fact "must believe that
it is highly probable that the facts are true or exist . . . yet it is not sufficient to believe that it is
merely more probable that they are true or exist than it is that they are false or do not exist." Id.
at 262-63.
13 Harold Collins, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.Frr. L. REP. (CCH)
20,910 (Aug.
30, 1979).
11 Id. at 23,690. The raising of the standard of proof by Collins in administrative proceedings
involving allegations of fraudulent conduct, where the subject of the proceeding may receive
severe personal and economic sanction, appears to protect the rights of the individual from being
penalized erroneously based upon inaccurate evidentiary inferences. Collins, 562 F.2d at 823.
See e.g., Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Sew., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation);
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (loss of citizenship); Gonzalez v. Landon, 350 U.S.
920 (1955) (per curiam) (expatriation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943)
(denaturalization) (cited in Comment, Scope of Review or Standard of Proof-JudicialControl
of SEC Sanctions: Steadman v. SEC, 93 H~Av. L. RBv. 1845, 1852 n.67 (1980)).
75 101 S. Ct. 999 (1981). See generally Steinberg, Steadman v. SEC- Its Implications and
Significance, 6 DEL. J. Cony. L. 1 (1981).
70 101 S.Ct. at 1004. Steadman involved a disciplinary proceeding brought by the SEC
pursuant to alleged violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80 a-I to
80b-52 (1976), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (1976).
Employing a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the SEC found the existence of statutory
violations and consequently suspended the defendant "for 1 year from associating with any
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decision, the Court focused on the language of section 7(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' 7 which the Court deemed to
establish a quantitative test applicable to all administrative agency

disciplinary proceedings.

8

The commodities laws contain no pre-

scribed standard regarding the burden of proof to be applied in administrative proceedings before it. On the other hand, section 7(c) of

the APA allows sanctions to be imposed in administrative disciplinary
proceedings when they are "in accordance with . . .substantial evidence." ' 79 The Court in Steadman found that "[the word 'substantial' denotes quantity" (preponderance) rather than quality (clear and
convincing) .80
If Steadman is to be applied to CFTC administrative proceedings
as Collins was initially, it now appears that in administrative proceedings conducted before the CFTC the Commission need only prove
statutory violations by a quantitative "preponderance of the evidence"
in order to impose remedial and punitive sanctions upon violators of
the Act and its accompanying regulations.
V.

STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY UNDER THE AcT's ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS

A. Scienter
The general anti-fraud provision of the Act is section 4b. 8 1
Essentially, this provision makes it unlawful to perpetrate any fraudulent or deceptive practices in connection with the making or sale of
commodity futures contracts. The overwhelming majority of administrative enforcement actions involve alleged violations of this provision. Section 4b itself is similar, but not identical, to the often-invoked
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws-section 10(b) of

broker or dealer in securities." 101 S.Ct. at 1004. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the use of a preponderance of the evidence test. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d
1126, 1143 (5th Cir. 1979).
77 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
71 101 S.Ct. at 1005.
79 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).

101 S.Ct. at 1006. In support of its conclusion, the Court examined the legislative history
of section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976), and found
legislative intent to be such that "[w]here there isevidence pro and con, the agency must weigh it
and decide in acc6rdance with the preponderance." 101 S.Ct. at 1007 (quoting H.R. REP. No.
1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1946)) (emphasis omitted).
81 7 U.S.C. §6 b (1976). This provision states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any correspon.
dent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection with any order to
make, or the making of any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or
go
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the Securities Exchange Act 82 and rule 10b-5, 83 promulgated thereunder. Actions brought under these anti-fraud provisions generally
share the common proof requirement of "scienter." In other words,

some element of intent to defraud or willful misconduct on the part of
the defendant must be established by the suing party. 84 Recent decisions construing section 4b, however, suggest a departure from the
strict scienter requirement and a possible shift toward examining the
effect of a particular course of conduct upon the commodity investor
rather than the presence of some affirmative intent on the part of the
actor."8
Early cases brought under section 4b rejected the notion that
liability could be imposed on a finding of mere negligence. For example, in McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co.,88 a private suit was brought by
a customer to recover losses for alleged unauthorized cotton commodity futures transactions entered into on his behalf by his commodity
broker. 87 The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

found that the verbiage utilized in section 4b of the Act ("cheat,"
on behalf of any other person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection with any
order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity for future
deliver., made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for
or on behalf of any other person if such contract for future delivery is or may be used
for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity or the
products or by-products thereof, or (b) determining the price basis of any transaction
in interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) delivering any such commodity
sold, shipped, or received in interstate commerce for the fulfillment thereof(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or
statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any
false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of
any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect
to such order or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or orders of
any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior consent of such
person to become the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person, or become
the seller in respect to any buying order of such person.
Id.
81 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
83 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). See generally Note, Reflections of lOb-5 in the "Pool" of
Commodity Futures Fraud, 14 Hous. L. REv. 899 (1977).
E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (damages held not to be
recoverable under section 10b and rule 1Ob-5 in absence of "intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud"); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F. Supp. 573, 575-76 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 477
F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding of mere negligence held not actionable under section 4b of
Commodities Exchange Act).
61 See notes 94-98 infra and accompanying text.
88 347 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972), af'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973).
87 Id. at 575.
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"defraud," and "willfully") connotes deliberate acts or a degree of
negligence that is so gross as to approach wilfullness, 88 and held that
the statute was meant to prohibit only intentionally deceptive conduct.89 As such, the court found that section 4b was clearly not
intended to impose liability for "good faith actions merely because
they are negligent or uninformed."9' 0
Similarly, in HaItmier v. CFTC,"' the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that for a section 4b violation, "[i]t is enough
that the commodities broker acted deliberately, knowing that his acts
were unauthorized and contrary to instruction. Such knowing, inten-

tional conduct made his acts willful, and therefore his violations of the
statutory prohibition against cheating or defrauding the customers
were wilful ... ."" Thus, by emphasizing the deliberate and willful nature of the misconduct, the court preserved intact the traditional

view that liability cannot be founded upon negligent conduct alone.
In contrast to the prevailing view that section 4b imposes a
scienter requirement, in a recent reparation proceeding9 3 between
private litigants9 4 the Commission affirmed an administrative law
judge's ruling that section 4b liability may be imposed for certain

" Id. at 576. Accord, Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management Co., 586 F.2d
1352 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 347 F. Supp. at 575-76.
90 Id. at 576.
o, 554 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977). Haltmier involved a judicial review of a CFTC administrative order, wherein the CFTC issued an order after an administrative proceeding prohibiting the
petitioner from trading commodity futures for a period of 18 months, pursuant to section 6(b) of
the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976), and ordering the petitioner to cease and desist from engaging in
unauthorized commodity futures transactions for customer accounts, pursuant to section 6(c) of
the Act, Id. § 13b. 554 F.2d at 559.
92 554 F.2d at 562 (citing Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977); George Steinberg
& Son, Inc. v. Butz, 491 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Goodman v.
Benson, 286 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1961); Eastern Produce Co. v. Benson, 278 F.2d 606 (3rd Cir.
1960)).
To avoid the problems inherent in proving and defending claims predicated upon alleged
unauthorized trading, such as in the Haltmier case, the Commission promulgated regulation
166.2, 17 C.F.R. § 166.2 (1981), which requires specific authorization by the customer for each
distinct transaction, or alternatively mandates discretionary authorization by the customer.
93 Pursuant to section 14 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976), any person may commence an
administrative reparations proceeding before the CFTC by alleging that he or she has suffered
damages as a consequence of "any violation of any provision of the Act or any rule, regulation or

order thereunder by any person who is registered or required to be registered under section 4d,
4e, 4k or 4m of the Act."
91 Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fucr. L.
RE. (CCH) 20,427 (une 14, 1977), af'd, No. 80-7212 (9th Cir. 1982).
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reckless, although unintentional, good faith failures on the part of a
broker to disclose certain risks involved in trading to a commodity
investor.9 5 In Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,°a the CFTC
found that the concept of constructive, as opposed to intentional
fraud, was the intended prohibition of section 4b(A) of the Act, and
held that such constructive fraud does not envision a showing of an
intentional breach of a fiduciary obligation, but encompasses the
effects of acts and omissions which are not in accordance with the
historical standards to which an investment fiduciary may be held.9 7
Thus, in applying the prohibitions of section 4b of the Act the CFTC
itself has focused upon the effect which particular reckless conduct
may have upon an investment, rather than upon the intent of the
party engaging in the particular conduct.9 8
Willful misconduct has also been held not to be a necessary
element to an enforcement action brought by the CFTC seeking to
enjoin the fraudulent sale of commodity options in violation of rule
30.01 911-a regulation promulgated by the Commission proscribing
deceitful practices in connection with the offering of commodity options. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 1.S. Love &
Associates Options, 0 0 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that in view of the general language of the regulation
and the "purposeful omission of the word 'willful"' in the rule, the
Commission could establish a violation absent evidence of willful
misconduct. 101
In addition to the section 4b anti-fraud provision, the Act contains section 4o(1),102 a more specific anti-fraud section which prohibits any commodity trading advisor' 0 3 or commodity pool opera91

Id. at 21,734.
11 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Co.m. Fu-r. L. REP. (CCH) 20,427 (June 14, 1977), aff'd,
No. 80-7212 (9th Cir. 1982).
97 Id. at 21,734.
9' See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 30.01 (1981). This rule generally prohibits the use of any instrumentality of
interstate commerce "(a) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud any other person; (b)
to make or cause to be made. . . any false report . . .; (c) to deceive or attempt to deceive any
other person by any means whatsoever," in connection with the purchase or sale of commodity
options. Id.
11 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
101Id. at 657-60.
I0 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1976). For an in-depth discussion of section 4o(1) liability standards, see
Mitchell, The Regulation of Commodity Trading Advisors, 27 EMORY L.J. 957, 990-94 (1978).
'"
Section 2(a)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), defines a commodity trading advisor as:
[Any person who, for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of commodities or as to the advisability of trading in any commodity for future delivery on
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tor 10 4 from employing "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any
client or . . . prospective client" 0 5 and from engaging in "any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or
deceit upon any client or ... prospective client."106 Under the 1978
amendments to the Act, section 4o(1) now applies both to CFTC
registrants, and to those commodity trading advisors and commodity
pool operators not registered under the Act but whose activities bring
them within the purview of the Act. 0 7 This anti-fraud provision,
which is unique to commodity pool operators and commodity trading
advisors, appears to evidence an intent by Congress to subject this
class of professionals to broader standards of liability than other
CFTC registrants, 10 8 such as the futures commission merchant or his
9
associates. 10

or subject to the rules of any contract market, or who for compensation or profit,
and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning commodities; but does not include (i) any bank or trust company, (ii) any
newspaper reporter, newspaper columnist, newspaper editor, lawyer, accountant,
or teacher, (iii) any floor broker or futures commission merchant, (vi) the publisher
of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine, or business or financial publication of
general and regular circulation including their employees, (v) any contract market,
and (vi) such other persons not within the intent of this definition as the Commission
may specify by rule, regulation, or order: Provided, that the furnishing of such
services by the foregoing persons is solely incidental to the conduct of their business
or profession.

Id.
104Section 2(a)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), defines a commodity pool operator as:
[A]ny person engaged in a business which is of the nature of an investment, trust,
syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits,
accepts or receives from others, funds, securities, or property, either directly or
through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of securities, or
otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market, but does not include such persons not
within the intent of this definition as the Commission may specify by rule or
regulation or by order.

Id.
Jos7 U.S.C. § 6o(l)(A) (1976).
"0I Id. § 6o(1)(B).
107Section 10 of the Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 10, 92 Stat. 870, 97th
Cong., 2d sess., deleted "registered under this chapter" following "pool operator." See note 7
supra.
100 See Mitchell, supra note 102, at 991.
109 Section 2(a)(1) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), defines a futures commission merchant as:
[I]ndividuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in
connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure
any trades or contracts that result or may result therefrom.
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The thrust of section 4o(1) is to impose liability based upon the
effect which particular acts or practices may have upon a client rather
than to impose liability predicated upon the intent or evil motive of
the commodity trading advisor or pool operator. Thus, section 4o(1)
prohibits conduct which "operates as a fraud or deceit" upon a client
or prospective client.1 10 Indeed, legislative history does not evidence
any congressional intent to impose a scienter requirement as a predicate for liability upon trading advisors or post operators."' This
broad basis for liability has been justified by the Commission's view of
the advisor as a fiduciary to his client.112 It is clear that but for
commodity trading advisors, many investors would not enter into
commodity transactions at all. Futhermore, commodity pool operators for their part are generally vested by their clients with a large
degree of discretion over client funds.
In summary, the Act tends to impose on those persons who fall
within the purview of section 4o a broader standard of care, predicating liability or breach of fiduciary duty on what, in some cases,
amounts to mere negligence. The more limited language of section 4b
of the Act, on the other hand, predicates liability on the basis of
deliberate, intentional and willful misconduct, with a showing of
mere negligence being insufficient to satisfy its scienter requirement.
B. Respondeat Superior
Regulation 166.3,1 3 promulgated under the Act, sets forth the
Commission's standards for the supervisory obligation of commodity
professionals as follows:
Each Commission registrant, except an associated person who has
no supervisory duties, must diligently supervise the handling of all
commodity interest accounts carried, operated, or advised by the
registrant and all other activities, of its partners, officers, employees and agents (or persons occupying a similar status or performing
a similar function) relating to its business as a Commission regis4
trant."
The phrase "must diligently supervise" contained in regulation
166.3 would appear to imply that there is a statutory limit upon the
110Id. § 6.(1).
"I See Mitchell, supra note 102, at 994 (citing S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35,
reprinted in [1974J U.S. CODE CONG. & Ad. News 5843, 5874).
"2 See Mitchell, supra note 102, at 993.
11 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1978); see id. § 1.51 (requiring contract markets to use "due diligence"
in enforcing their rules). For a discussion of the Commission's intent concerning 17 C.F.R. §
166.3 (1978), see 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,746 n.7 (1977).
11417 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1981) (emphasis added).
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secondary liability of a principal or controlling person for the acts or
omissions of an agent or employee. As one writer has noted, it seems
that under regulation 166.3 there may exist a good faith, due diligence
defense to an assertion of secondary liability." 5
Regulation 166.3 must be studied in light of section 2(a)(1) of the
Act," 6 however, which provides in pertinent part:
[T]he act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other
person acting for any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope of his employment or office shall be
deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, association,
partnership, corporation, or trust, as well as of such official, agent,
7
or other person."1
Section 2(a)(1) of the Act appears to adopt the common law.
doctrine of respondeat superior or "let the master beware" "" in holding the principal secondarily liable for the acts of an agent committed
within the scope of the agent's employment. "19 Indeed, cases construing section 2(a)(1) have focused on agency principles rather than the
relative fault of the supervision. For example, in McHaney v. Winchester-Hardin-OpenheimerTrading Co.,' 2 0 a CFTC reparation proceeding involving a customer who invested with what he believed to
be a branch office of a commodity futures commission merchant, an
administrative law judge found that where an investor reasonably
relied on objective indication that the branch office was acting on
behalf of the ostensible firm and was subject to its control, the latter
was liable for the acts and omissions of the former "under agency
principles governing apparent authority and Section 2(a)(1) of the
Act." 12 Similarly, in DiPietrov. London Commodity House 22 also a
CFTC reparation proceeding, a commodity trading advisor was held
liable for the unauthorized fraudulent conduct of one of its employees
in soliciting an account, the central inquiry being not whether the
employee was "engaged in a fraud upon a third person,"'' 2 3 but

I's See Markham & Meltzer, Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange ActRespondeat Superior, Aiding and Abetting, Supervision, and Scienter, 27 Emony L.J. 1115, 1160
(1978).
16 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
117

Id.

18

BLACK's LAW DIcriONARY 1475 (4th ed. 1968).
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AcENcy § 219 (1968).

"

120[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,586 (April 3, 1978).
121 Id. at 22,426.
122 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,562 (Feb. 22, 1978).
123 Id. at 22,302.
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whether such employee was acting within the scope of his authority
when perpetrating such fraud. 24 In view of the well-settled interpretation of section 2(a)(1) which incorporates traditional notions of
respondeat superior, the apparent due diligence defense contained in
regulation 166.3 may be of limited effect. Suits brought under section
2(a)(1) will continue to trigger an agency law analysis regardless of
whether the standards of regulation 166.3 are allegedly violated.
Moreover, although congressional mandates are considered the law,
administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority may not be given the same effect. 25
C. Aiding and Abetting
Section 13(a) of the Act 26 establishes specific grounds for aiding
and abetting liability. That provision provides:
Any person who commits, or who willfully aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, or procures the commission of, a violation of
any of the provisions of this Act, or any or the rules, regulations or
orders issued pursuant to this Act, or who acts in combination or
concert with any other person in any such violation, or who willfully causes an act to be done or omitted which if directly performed or omitted by him or another would be a violation of the
provisions of this Act or any of such rules, regulations, or orders
may be held responsible in administrativeproceedings under this
27
Act for such violation as a principal.
As the language in the statute indicates, application of section
13(a) appears to be limited to administrative proceedings. Nonetheless, in Bogard v. Abraham-Reitz & Co. West, 128 a CFTC reparation
proceeding between private litigants, an administrative law judge
applied section 13(a) in imposing liability upon a futures commission
merchant. 29 Moreover, some decisional law suggests that non-Act
theories of aiding and abetting may be invoked in other forums under

1 4 Id.

1,. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); Reid v. Memphis
Pub. Co., 521 F.2d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); Commissioner v.
Clark, 202 F.2d 94, 98 (7th Cir. 1953). Section 6 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
551(4) (1976). states that - 'rule' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy ..... * Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of agency rule-making authority, see
generally III L. Loss, Sacuarrms REGULATION 1936-44 (2d ed. 1961k.
116 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1976).
127Id. (emphasis added).
1.. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoImt. Fryr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,963 (Jan. 23, 1980).
119 Id. at 23,838.
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appropriate circumstances. For example, in CFTC v. Crown Colony
Commodity Options, Ltd. ,130 injunctive relief was granted by a district court judge on the basis of a finding that the defendants had

"promoted, aided and abetted or participated" in violating the com-

modity laws. 1 3' In reaching its decision, the court apparently applied
tort law standards sub silencio,13 1 rather than section 13(a), thus
suggesting that a determination of aiding and abetting may be made

without reliance on section 13(a), at least in contexts other than that
of the administrative proceeding.
An important question arising under section 13(a) is what standard to apply in assessing aider and abettor liability. The language of
section 13(a) indicates a legislative intent that liability be limited to
instances of "willful" conduct. 33 Section 13(a) basically mirrors the
federal criminal aiding and abetting statute. 34 Unlike the criminal
statute, however, section 13(a) contains the word "willfully" as a
modifier of "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures."1 35 An examination of the legislative hearings concerning section 13(a) also reveals that the drafters' intent was to predicate aiding
and abetting liability upon a knowing and willful act in which the
alleged aider and abettor shared in the evil intent of the principal
36
actor. 1
"0 434 F.Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

131Id. at 918.
13-In his discussion, Judge Weinfeld did not even mention section 13(a). Instead, after
discussing the defendants' "boiler room" operations, he concluded that "[ejach of the defendants
promoted, aided, abetted or participated in the 'boiler room.' " Id. Section 876 of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs provides:

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to
a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTS § 876 (1979).

In the context of securities and other investment transactions, many courts have appeared to
rely upon tort law principles governing aider and abettor liability. See e.g., Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973).
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
"' See 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1976).
" 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1976).
13 That it was the intent of Congress to require willful conduct under section 13(a) is clear
from the following discussion during the legislative hearings:
MRS. PROKOP. What we are trying to accomplish here is to make applicable to
administrative proceedings, the same type of responsibility that applies in criminal
proceedings under the provisions of title 18 U.S.C., section 2. Now, title 18 U.S.C.,
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Decisional law has been consistent with the apparent legislative
intent to require knowing participation as a basis for section 13(a)
liability. Thus, in In re Williams,137 a CFTC administrative disciplinary proceeding, culpability under section 13(a) was held to require
some willful conduct, the performance of mere ministerial acts by a
38
Simibrokerage house secretary being insufficient for liability.
larly, in a recent CFTC administrative enforcement proceeding, In re
Richardson Securities,139 the Commission found that "proof of a
specific unlawful intent to further the violation is necessary before a
broker can be found liable for aiding and abetting a violation of the
Act," ' 40 and refused to impose remedial sanctions upon a futures
commission merchant for negligently permitting its agents and em-

section 2, does not have the word "willfully" in it. It is perhaps inherent under the
decisions in regard to offenses like abetting and I think it would be implied with
respect to counseling, commanding, inducing, procuring, and so forth. It is not clear
that it is inherent in the word "aiding." We did not tend to hold someone responsible
for an unintentional aiding of someone's improper actions in an administrative
proceeding. So we put in the word "willfully" in conjunction with "aiding." We did
not tend to hold someone responsible for an unintentional aiding of someone's
improper actions in an administrative proceeding. So we put in the word "willfully"
in conjunction with "aiding," feeling that this would solve the problem from the
standpoint of the trade who were concerned.
MR. DOLE: In other words, you mean one can commit a violation unknowingly or
unwillfully and be punished under section 27[§13(a)]?
MRS. PROKOP. No. You see, we put the word "willfully" ahead of "aiding,"
because the word "aid" under some of the decisions was not clearly limited to
situations in which there was a knowing participation. It did not seem to be
necessary to add that word with respect to the rest of the activities in that series,
because inherently, they include some element of knowledge.
What we are trying to do in this section is to make applicable to administrative
proceedings the same standard that would apply under 18 U.S.C. 2.
MR. DOLE: So really, it would not make an) difference if the word "willfully" were
moved ahead of the word "commits?"
MRS. PROKOP: As long as it was understood that this is not going to add any
requirement beyond what we would have to show in a criminal case ...
MR. DOLE: I do not think you are going to proceed unless somebody has willfully
done this thing.
MRS. PROKOP: If it is an unknowing action, we would not hold him, certainly.
ProposedAmendments to the Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 11930 and H.R.
12317 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-7 (1967).
137[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Commssi. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) 20,201, aff'd, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Commf. Ftrr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,560 (Feb. 13, 1978).
13,Id. at XXX. In Williams, the secretary prepared and disseminated commodity advisory
materials while knowing that her principal was not duly registered with the Commission.
Nonetheless, because the secretary's actions were not in willful violation of the law, she was not
found guilty of aiding and abetting her employer. Id. at XXX.
"1 2 CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,145 (Jan. 27, 1981).
14o Id.

at 26,642.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

468

[Vol. 12:445

ployees to engage in what was held to be fraudulent and deceptive
violative activities. 141
Thus, while section 13(a) liability for engaging in aiding and
abetting conduct is clearly applicable to CFTC disciplinary administrative proceedings, it has also been applied by the Commission in
private reparation proceedings, and common law aiding and abetting
liability has been invoked by district court judges in civil injunctive
actions commenced by the Commission. The Commission itself appears to predicate section 13(a) aiding and abetting liability upon a
knowing and willful intentional act in furtherance of the primary
illegal violator's conduct, necessitating an unlawful and improper
motive on the part of the alleged aider and abettor.
CONCLUSION

In its administrative and investigative capacities, the CFTC has
engaged in an aggressive enforcement program to protect the public
from abuses in the trading of commodity instruments and to insure the
integrity of domestic markets. 42 This article has attempted to explore the broad and far-reaching investigative and enforcement
powers of the Commission and to examine the administrative procedures and philosophy which the agency has invoked in the short time
since its inception in 1974. The Commission has proven not to be the
mirror image of the SEC, but has advanced to the forefront of federal
regulatory agencies in seeking to invoke procedures for the equitable
and efficient administration of the laws which it is charged with
enforcing. 43 Although the Commission has admittedly experienced
growing pains, 44 it has nonetheless shown itself to be sensitive to the
rights of alleged violators who appear before it while remaining cognizant of its important obligation to expeditiously discipline those per-

"4 Id.

at 26,646.

142 As an important adjunct to the federal government's efforts to enforce the federal commodities laws, section 6d of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (1978), enables designated state enforcement
officials to enforce the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder pursuant to the parens
patriae doctrine.
143 See generally Bagley, Introduction:A New Body of Law in an Era of Industry Growth, 27
ENioRY L.J. 849 (1978).
4

See, e.g., Smith, The Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the Return of the

Bucketeers: A Lesson in Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D. L. REv. 7 (1981); the extensive four-part
critique of the CFTC in the Washington Post: How to Save an Agency or Blueprintfor Change,
Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1977, § B, at 6, col. 5; Critics Urge That CFTC Be Dismantled. id.. Oct.
27, 1977, § D, at 10, col. 1; Difficulties at CFTC: Both Style and Substance. id., Oct. 26, 1977, §
E, at 1, col. 5; Commodities FuturesPanel Target of DisparateCritics, id., Oct. 25, 1977 § D, at
7, col. 1.
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sons and entities who ignore the standards to which the public expects
the industry to adhere.
An examination of the investigative and administrative powers
and philosophy of an agency such as the CFTC must necessarily delve
both into the realm of procedural administrative law and substantive
commodities regulation law. The CFTC exercises both (a) a judicial
function, including the imposition of remedial and punitive sanctions,
and the interpretation of the commodities laws which it regulates; and
(b) a prosecutorial function, including the investigation and enforcement of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 45 As
with similar agencies, this duality creates a difficult tension in terms
of practical application. As a former Chairman of the CFTC has
critiqued:
One serious structural defect that must be corrected involves
the decisional process in adversarial administrative cases. An inherent and pervasive "undue process" exists at the CFTC and all
comparable agencies when the Commission itself is rule maker,
policeman, grand jury, prosecutor, judge, and jury with de novo
powers in the same case at virtually the same time. The agency has
"'heard" your case at least three and perhaps more times before you
have a hearing. The minds of men are simply not supple enough to
and reputajudge a defendant's culpability fairly when vindication
48
tion are also at stake in an adversarial proceeding.
It is within this context that the Commission will itself be judged
and compared with other regulatory bodies. To continue as an effective agency with its own identity, the Commission must maximize
enforcement of the Act through its own administrative efforts while
maintaining an even-handed and equitable approach which is consistent with the goals underlying the commodities laws.
NJ. CAnnow, THlE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
116Bagley. supra note 143, at 851.
145 Sce

16 (1948).

